Cuban Missile Crisis Effects
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The world as we know it today came very close to a nuclear war in the year of 1962, in October. The United States of America and the Soviet Union had collected their missiles in Cuba. However, the timely intervention of the US President Kennedy with the Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev stopped the nuclear war. After that America and Russia was involved in a cold war for a long time. The new Russian leader Leonid Brezhnev led Russia o victory in the cold war.
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Leonid Brezhnev was in a huge race with new arms with America and their weapons were much ahead of the latter. Only after President Ronald Reagan came into power the weapons got better. When Reagan was the president, in order to avoid a third World War, they got into a nuclear parity by signing the Warsaw Pact. The United States assured Russia that Cuba would not be invaded provided the nuclear weapons are moved from there. Then the war in Vietnam had already begun. At that time the Cubans and Fidel Castro got very angry that Russians had agreed to pull out their missiles. However, the turning point in the cold war came when America was on a constant decline and yet maintained her guard. Then came a point when Reagan decided to steer the cold war to a peace pact. This came much later after the Russians were confronted in Vietnam and America and Russia both suffered serious losses on war grounds. Finally a successful peace treaty was signed.
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Cuban Missile Crisis Timeline
 It is believed in history that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest that the world ever got to a nuclear war. At that time United States was on the highest alert possible and Soviet commanders in Russian army were prepared for a nuclear war and had installed their nuclear weapons in Cuba. The two national leaders, President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, wanted that war was called off. They both knew it was not the right thing to do. However, even though the war was averted, it was not done on friendly terms. More..
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